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Case Comment
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court
The State of Massachusetts indicted defendant for the sexual
assault of three minor females.' During preliminary hearings, the trial
judge ordered the courtroom closed to the public throughout defendant's
trial.' Globe Newspaper Company (Globe), intending to provide cover-
age of the trial, moved to revoke the closure order.3 The trial judge denied
the motion citing a Massachusetts statute that mandated closure in cases
involving minor sex crime victims.4
Asserting a right of access under the first and sixth amendments,
Globe appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.5 During
the pendency of the appeal, defendant's trial proceeded to conclusion in
an acquittal.6 The Supreme Judicial Court determined that the con-
clusion of defendant's trial rendered Globe's appeal moot.' Despite this
1. Commonwealth v. Albert Aladjem, No. 73102-9 (Super. CL for the County of Norfolk
(Mass.) May 10, 1979). The indictments contained allegations of forcible rape and forced
unnatural rape. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 849,401 N.E.2d
360, 363 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Globe 1].
2. The court issued the order on its own motion and not at the request of the prosecution.
The defendant objected to the order. Globe 1, 379 Mass. at 847-48, 401 N.E.2d at 362-
63.
3. In addition to a motion to revoke the closure order, Globe made motions to intervene
and for a hearing on the closure decision. Id. at 847, 401 N.E.2d at 362.
4. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 278, § 16A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980), states:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other
crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person
upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been com-
mitted, . . . the presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the
court room, admitting only such persons as may have a direct interest in the
case.
In ruling that section 16A required closure, the trial judge stated, "This ruling and Order
results from a reading of the statute and from the feeling of the Court that a child-victim of an
alleged sexual attack is entitled minimally to at least the same protection that a child-
defendant in a case involving sexual matters has." Globe I, 379 Mass. at849, 401 N.E.2d at
363.
5. Globe 1, 379 Muss. 846. 401 N.E.2d 360 (1980). Globe initially petitioned a single
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 211, § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980). After a hearing, the Justice denied Globe's motion.
Globe then appealed to the full court. Globe I, 379 Mass. at 847, 401 N.E.2d at 362.
6. Globe 1,379 Mass. at 847, 849, 401 N.E.2d at 362, 363.
7. Id. at 847, 401 N.E.2d at 362.
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finding, the court considered the merits of Globe's arguments because the
appeal raised important issues which often evade review.8 The court
declined, however, to reach the constitutional claims which Globe raised
because of the pending Supreme Court decision in Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia.9
Resolution of the case focused instead on the statutory construction
of section 16A, the Massachusetts closure law.' 0 In analyzing section
16A, the Supreme Judicial Court identified two statutory objectives
requiring derogation of the common law practice of open trials." First, the
legislature intended to promote the administration of justice by en-
couraging minor sex crime victims to come forward and testify. 2 Second,
the legislature sought to enhance the narrative ability of minor victims at
trial by minimizing the psychological harm resulting from open testi-
mony.'3 The court held, with one justice dissenting, that these statutory
objectives mandated closure only during the victims' testimony, not for
the entire trial as the lower court had ordered."
Globe appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which vacated
the Supreme Judicial Court's judgment and remanded the case in light of
Richmond Newspapers." Reversing itself on remand, the Supreme
Judicial Court held that the case was not moot as to Globe's first
amendment claims.' 6 The court applied what it perceived as the
Richmond Newspapers standard, but concluded that Richmond News-
papers did not require the invalidation of section 16A."
8. The court stated, "The issues raised by this record, however, are significant and
troublesome, and are 'capable of repetition yet evading review.' . . . We deem it
appropriate therefore to express our views on the issues argued." Id. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at
362 (citations omitted).
9. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Richmond Newspapers].
10. Globe 1, 379 Mass. at 853-55, 401 N.E.2d at 366.
11. Id. at 857-61, 401 N.E.2d at 367-69.
12. Id. at 857, 401 N.E.2d at 367-68.
13. Id. at 859-60, 401 N.E.2d at 369.
14. Id. at 861,401 N.E.2d at 369-70. Moreover, the court found this construction of the
statute consistent with the policy favoring publicity. See id. at 861, 401 N.E.2d at 370.
15. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 449 U.S. 894 (1980). In Richmond
Newspapers, a Virginia trial court, pursuant to statute, granted defendant's unopposed
motion to close his fourth trial stemming from a single charge of murder. The trial judge
denied appellant-newspaper's request to vacate the closure order. After the defendant's
acquittal, the trial court granted the newspaper's retroactive motion to intervene. The
Virginia Supreme Court denied the newspaper's petition for writs of mandamus and
prohibition. On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Virginia
Supreme Court. The Court held that in the absence of an overriding contrary interest, the
first amendment protects the right of the public to attend criminal trials. 448 U.S. 555
(1980).
16. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1493, 1496 n.4,423
N.E.2d 773, 775 n.4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Globe Ill.
17. The Supreme Judicial Court considered the following three factors in applying the
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Globe again appealed to the Supreme Court where it successfully
argued that the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of section 16A
violated the first amendment.II Acknowledging that the right of access is
not absolute, the Court nonetheless found the state interests advanced by
section 16A insufficient to justify denial of the right. 9 Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S.CL 2613 (1982).
I.
History and jurisprudence support the public trial concept.20 The
framers of the Constitution incorporated the common law right of the
accused to a public trial into the sixth amendment.2' Most states followed
Richmond Newspapers standard: First, the court considered whether closure during the
testimony of a minor sex crime victim violated the open trial tradition to the same degree as
had the closure of the entire murder trial in Richmond Newspapers. The court decided that
such an exclusion of the public did not violate the tradition emphasized in Richmond
Newspapers because the Globe case fell under the sex crime exception to the open trial
tradition.
Second, the court inquired into section 16A's impact on the functioning of
democratic institutions. The court noted that the statute's restriction was limited to
immediate public observance of the minor sex crime victim. The Richmond Newspapers
trial judge, in contrast, had closed the entire trial. The Supreme Judicial Court, therefore,
described the statute's impact as only a temporary diminution of information.
Third, the court addressed the question of whether substantial state interests
supported the statute. Globe did not dispute that substantial state interests could compel
closure of a trial; Globe asserted that a mandatory rule intruded excessively on the
constitutional rights of the public. Globe suggested that trial courts should assess the
victim's psychological vulnerability to open testimony in each particular case. Globe
contended that case-by-case determinations would advance the state's interests effica-
ciously and with a minimum of infringement upon first amendment concerns. The court
rejected Globe's suggestion as cumbersome and pointed out that any such inquiry would be
of dubious psychological accuracy. The court further held that a case-by-case approach
would destroy the certainty in protection that the statute provides to families and victims.
Globe II, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1501-05, 423 N.E.2d at 777-781.
18. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Globe III]. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices White, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Powell. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger
wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting
opinion.
19. Id. at 2621-22.
20. The Richmond Newspapers plurality opinion cited Blackstone, Hale, Bentham,
Wigmore, and other authorities in support of the practical benefits accruing to the judicial
system as the result of open trials. 448 U.S. at 569-73. Chief Justice Burger observed in
Richmond Newspapers that the English tradition of open trials predated the Norman
Conquest in 1066 A.D. Id. at 564-65.
21. This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused
has its roots in our English common law heritage. The exact date of its origin
is obscure, but it likely evolved long before the settlement of our land as an
accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial. . . . Following the
ratification in 1791 of the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, which
Law and Inequality
suit in their own constitutions and the open trial has continued as an
accepted practice into modem times." This recognized tradition, how-
ever, has not prevented trial courts from exercising their inherent
authority to limit courtroom access. Trial judges occasionally exclude the
public either from the entire trial or from portions of certain pro-
ceedings.2"
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,14 the Supreme Court considered
whether the public has an independent right to attend pretrial pro-
ceedings. The Court held that the sixth amendment does not grant a
public right to attend pretrial proceedings or criminal trials."2 Gannett
stressed that the sixth amendment's public trial guarantee belongs to the
defendant, not the public.2 6 The majority refused to discuss a possible
first amendment source for the right of access. 7
Richmond Newspapers addressed the unresolved issue of whether
the first amendment guarantees the public right of access to trials. The
Court did not issue a majority opinion in Richmond Newspapers.2" Seven
commands that 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial . . . 'most of the original states and those
subsequently admitted to the Union adopted similar constitutional pro-
visions. Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute,
or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the public.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-68 (1948) (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 267-68.
23. The public trial concept has . .. never been viewed as imposing a rigid,
inflexible straightjacket on the courts. It has uniformly been held to be
subject to the inherent power of the court to preserve order and decorum in
the courtroom, to protect the rights of parties and witnesses, and generally to
further the administration of justice ...
The authority thus residing in the trial court must be acknowledged as an
implicit qualification of the general rule of openness of judicial pro-
ceedings ...
People v. Jelke. 308 N.Y. 56. 63. 123 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1954).
24. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). Gannett involved a pretrial hearing to consider the
suppression of evidence in a murder prosecution. Defense attorneys made an unopposed
request for closure due to concern with adverse publicity. The court granted the defendant's
motion and excluded the public and press, including a newspaper reporter whose publisher
then unsuccessfully moved to set aside the closure order. The New York Appellate Division
vacated the closure order, but the New York Court of Appeals reinstated the order. On
certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.
25. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell and Rehnquist also
wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun wrote an opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall.
26. 443 U.S. at 381, 391.
27. Id. at 392. Justice Powell's concurrence, however, explicitly recognized the public's
first amendment right of access to pretrial proceedings. Id. at 397 (PowelL J., con-
curring).
28. Chief Justice Burger wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices White and
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of the justices did agree, however, that the public possessed an inde-
pendent right under the first amendment to attend criminal trials.2 9
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion devoted considerable
attention to the tradition of jury trials in England and America.30 The
Chief Justice traced a historical record which demonstrated that signi-
ficant policy concerns supported the open trial concept. These concerns
included the fostering of public confidence in the legal system," the
accuracy of the fact-finding process,3" and the satisfaction of the
community's desire forjustice." From this historic practice, ChiefJustice
Burger concluded that open trials are presumed to be an essential feature
of the criminal justice system.3 4
In addition to reliance on historic practice, the Chief Justice derived
a textual basis for a first amendment right of access. He reasoned that the
express freedoms of speech, press, and assembly share a common goal in
guaranteeing open discussion of governmental affairs."5 Closure of
criminal trials denies the public information which otherwise promotes
discussion of the criminal justice system. Closure, therefore, undermines
the rights of speech, press, and assembly in the context of criminal trials. 6
Chief Justice Burger inferred a public right to attend criminal trials from
Stevens. Justices White, Stevens, Stewart, and Blackmun all wrote separate concurring
opinions. Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall. Justice
Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
29. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White, Stevens, Stewart, Blackmun, Brennan
and Marshall agreed that the first amendment extended such a right. Richmond Vews-
papers, 448 U.S. at 580; id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring). id. at 599 (Stewart, J.,
concurring): id. at 604 (Blackmun, J.. concurring).
30. Id. at 564-73.
31. Id. at572 (" 'The educative effect of public attendance is a material advantage. Not
only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance acquired with the methods
of government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies is secured which could never be
inspired by a system of secrecy.' ") (quoting 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1834 (J.
Chadbourn rev. 1976) ).
32. Open trials aid in the prevention of perjury and decisions motivated by secret bias.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569. The openness of trials also serves notice to
possible witnesses who may provide valuable evidence. Id. at 570 n.8.
33. When a reprehensible crime is committed, strong emotional reactions take
place in all of us. . . . All our ingrained concepts of morality and "justice"
come into play, all our ancient tribal fears of anything that threatens the
security of the group. It is one of the marks of a civilized culture that it has
devised legal procedures that minimize the impact of emotional reactions
and strive for calm and rational disposition.
H. Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 130-31 (1956), cited with approval in Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571.
34. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573. See also id. at 564-75 and n.9.
35. Id. at 575.
36. Id. at 576-77. The Chief Justice noted that these express freedoms "would otherwise
lose much meaning." Id. at 577.
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the significance that accessibility holds for express first amendment
guarantees."'
Unwilling to accept Chief Justice Burger's characterization of the
right of access, Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion in Richmond
Newspapers. He found that, in addition to encouraging the rights of
individual expression, access to trials promoted democratic government.
Justice Brennan contended that the first amendment plays a dual role as
guarantor of individual expression38 and catalyst for self-government.3 9
The first amendment performs the latter structural role by ensuring the
flow of information that citizens need in order to participate in the
democratic process.'0 According to Justice Brennan, when the press
publishes information that contributes to meaningful public debate it
advances self-government. 4' First amendment protection extends to
press activity that is consistent with this structural role.
The ambit of protection under the structural role embraces a
theoretically infinite range of information-gathering activities. 2 Justice
Brennan recognized the need to limit first amendment protection in
access cases by weighing the value of the information sought against the
interests invaded. 43 He proposed two principles to aid in qualifying
structural role protection for press activity. First, the courts must
determine whether the particular proceeding carries a tradition of
37. The state of Virginia had argued that the Constitution does not expressly recognize
access to trials. Chief Justice Burger responded by noting the Court's practice of deriving
unexpressed rights by virtue of their necessity. "[T] he Court has acknowledged that certain
unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated guarantees." Id. at 579. As examples,
Burger listed the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); the right to
privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the right to be presumed innocent,
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); the right to be judged by a standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, In re Winship, 397 U.S.358 (1970); and the
right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
38. "Customarily, First Amendment guarantees are interposed to protect communica-
tion between speaker and listener. When so employed against prior restraints, free speech
protections are almost insurmountable." Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586-87
(citations omitted).
39 Id. at 586-87. "[T] he First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free
expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to
play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government." Id. at 587
(emphasis in the original). Justice Brennan drew support for his first amendment approach
from the writings of Professor Zechariah Chafee. See Brennan, Address, 32 Rutgers L Rev.,
173, 176 (1979). Chafee asserted that the first amendment protects an individual interest in
the free expression of views on important issues. See Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United
States 33 (1946). The first amendment also advances a societal interest in vigorous debate
that ensures the wise administration of government. Id.
40. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587-88.
41. Id.




accessibility." Second, the courts must decide whether public access
conforms with the structural purposes the proceeding serves in a
democratic scheme of government.'
5
Application of Justice Brennan's first principle to the criminal trial
proceeding dictated a finding that its tradition of accessibility strongly
influenced recognition of the right of access.' 6 Accessibility, moreover,
satisfied the second principle by advancing policies that benefit the trial
institution in terms of its role in the government structure.' Justice
Brennan concluded that a public right of access to criminal trials is
consistent with the structural role of the first amendment.'
8
While Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan reached the same
outcome on the facts in Richmond Newspapers, their views on the nature
of the right of access differed significantly. Their divergent opinions in
Globe reflect this discord.
II.
The Globe case presented the narrow issue of whether section 16A
violated the first amendment by denying the constitutional right of
access.49 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan began his perfunctory
analysis by restating the considerations that led to the Richmond
Newspapers holding on a public right of access.5 0 Justice Brennan then
applied his structural role principles to the Globe facts since the
challenged regulation had the effect of hampering the ability to gather
news.
5 1
44. Consideration of historical practice is justified because history provides a gloss on
the constitution and because "a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of
experience." Id. at 589.
45. "[T] he value of access must be measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by
rhetorical statements that all information bears upon public issues; what is crucial ... is
whether access to a particular government process is important in terms of that very
process." Id.
46. Id. at 589-93.
47. Brennan found that open trials ensure the appearance of fairness in the judicial
process, id. at 594; they foster public confidence in democratic self-government, id. at 595-
96; they contribute to the accuracy of the fact-finding process. Id.
48. Id. at 597-98.
49. Globe 111, 102 S. Ct. at 2615-16 (1982).
50. Brennan noted a broad construction of the first amendment, which encompasses
unenumerated rights, the importance to self-government, the gloss of history, and structural
value. Id. at 2618-20.
51. "The Court's approach in right-of-access cases simply reflects the special nature of a
claim of [the] First Amendment right to gather information." See Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 586. The facts in Globe did not invoke the traditional first amendment
guarantees for free expression because section 16A had not directly abridged speech or
publication. See, e.g., supra note 38.
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Under Justice Brennan's first principle of structural role analysis,
Globe's access claim had special force owing to the traditional openness of
criminal trials.52 Justice Brennan determined under his second principle
that accessibility enhances integrity and efficiency in the trial process and
promotes public respect." By serving these specific structural values,
public access plays an important role with regard to the goals of the
criminal trial institution."' Consequently, Justice Brennan recognized the
right of access to the testimony of minor rape victims.
Justice Brennan acknowledged that the right of access was not
absolute." Denial of the right, however, requires a compelling state
interest opposing access.16 The state must demonstrate not only that the
statute advances a compelling state interest,"' but also that the statute is
narrowly tailored to advance the state interests with a minimum of first
amendment infringement.5 "
While Justice Brennan conceded that the protection of victims'
psychological health was a compelling interest, 9 he concluded that,
because of its mandatory nature, section 16A was not narrowly tailored.
The statute mandated closure even when the victim would not suffer
psychological harm or when the victim desired publicity.60 Justice
Brennan also found that the state failed to demonstrate empirically that
section 16A encouraged minor sex crime victims to come forward and
testify." He questioned the statute's efficacy given its failure to restrict
52. Globe III, 102 S. CL at 2618-19; see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
586.
53. Globe III, 102 S.Ct. at 2620.
54. Id., at 2619-20; see supra note 47.
55. Id. at 2620.
56. Justice Brennan suggested in Richmond Newspapers that consideration of national
security could outweigh the right of access and justify closure of portions of trials. 448 U.S.
at 598 n.24.
57. Globe III, 102 S.Ct at 2620.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2621. Justice Brennan implied in a footnote, however, that the injury
attributable to open testimony was minimal:
It is important to note that in the context of § 16A, the measure of the State's
interest lies not in the extent to which minor victims are injured by testifying,
but rather in the incremental injury suffered by testifying in the presence of
the press and the general public.
Id. at 2621 n.19 (emphasis in the original).
60. Id. at 2621. Justice Brennan did not respond to the observation of the state of
Massachusetts that the hypothetical minor rape victim who actually wished publicity would
be totally free to pursue it outside the courtroom. See Appellee's Brief at 47, Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S.Ct. 2614 (1982).
61. Globe III, 102 S.Ct. at262 1. The Supreme Judicial Court in Globe I, cited numerous
social science authorities to support the proposition that closure would advance the
statutory purposes of section 16A. Globe 1. 379 Mass. at 858-60 nn. 11-20,401 N.E.2d at
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access to other sources of information about the victim's testimony.62
Justice Brennan concluded that this state interest failed to justify denial of
the right of access.
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger argued that the
historical record militates against the claim of access to trials involving
minor sex crime victims. He emphasized that society has traditionally
safeguarded the interests of minor sex crime victims through closure of
trials.63 Chief Justice Burger contended, as the Supreme Judicial Court
had on remand, that section 16A passes constitutional scrutiny due to its
minimal effect on the first amendmenL"
Ill.
The majority of the Court in Globe adopted Justice Brennan's first
amendment theory with its specific principles of application over Chief
Justice Burger's approach which stressed adherence to historic practice.
Globe raises questions of whether Justice Brennan's analysis is internally
consistent and whether the result satisfies the stated objectives of that
analysis.
Justice Brennan identified the particular proceeding at issue in
Globe as a general criminal trial.65 He rejected the arguments of the state
of Massachusetts and Chief Justice Burger that the Court must dis-
tinguish Globe from Richmond Newspapers because Globe involved
minor sex crime victims. Justice Brennan asserted that in ascertaining
whether a right of access exists in individual cases the Court should not
refer to the context of the particular proceeding.
6
"
Critics of the legal system's handling of sex crimes denounce those
practices that treat rape victims differently from other victims of crime.
6
368-69 nn. 11-20. The court in Globe 11 reemphasized that empirical research supports the
aims of the statute. Globe II, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1507, 423 N.E.2d at 781.
62. Justice Brennan noted that section 16A did not deny access to the transcript, court
personnel. or other sources of information about a victim's testimony. Globe III, 102 S.CL
at 2622.
63. Id. at 2624.
64. Id. at 2625, see Globe II, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1507, 423 N.E.2d at 781.
65. Globe III, 102 S.C. at 2619-20.
66. Whether the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials can be
restricted in the context of any particular criminal trial, such as a murder trial
(the setting for the dispute inRichmondNewspapers) or a rape trial, depends
not on the historical openness of that type of criminal trial but rather on the
state interests assertedly supporting the restriction.
Id. at 2619 n.13.
67. Note, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 Calif. L Rev. 919,938-
39 (1973); Berger, Man's Trial, Women's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
Colum. L Rev. 1, 7-12 (1977).
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Examples of such inequitable treatment include corroboration require-
ments, 68 evidentiary use of the victim's sexual history,6 9 and special
cautionary instructions to the jury.7 0 This extraordinary treatment of rape
victims is founded in conventional notions about women's status and
duplicitous standards of sexual conduct." Society historically has
defined rape in male terms." This ignores women's experience of rape as
68. See Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L J.
1365 (1972).
69. This rule is based upon the theory that a woman who has previously
consented to an act of sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent
again to such an act, thereby negating the charge that force and violence were
used against her in order to accomplish the rape.
People v. Walker, 150 Cal. App. 2d 594, 601, 310 P.2d 110, 114-15 (1957).
70. "[I]t must be remembered, that [rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to
be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent." 1 Hale,
The History of the Pleas of the Crown 635 (1st Am. ed. 1847).
71. Note, Sexism in Society, supra note 67 at 938, 939; Berger, supra note 67 at 25. One
California judge noted:
The relevance of past sexual conduct of the alleged victim of the rape with
persons other than the defendant to the issue of her consent to a particular act
of sexual intercourse with the defendant is slight at best. The historical rule
allowing the evidence may be more a creature of a one-time male fantasy of
the "girls men date and the girls men marry" than one of logical
inference.
People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal. App. 3d 685, 690-91, 128 CaL Rptr. 864, 886-67 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1976).
72. [T] he crime of rape centers on penetration . .. But penile invastion of the
vagina may be less pivotal to women's sexuality, pleasure or violation, than it
is to male sexuality. This definitive element of rape centers upon a male-
defined loss, not coincidentally also upon the way men define loss of
exclusive access.
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward a Feminist Juris-
prudence, 8 Signs 635. 647 (1983).
The legal impossibility of rape of a wife by her husband is another indication
that rape laws are not aimed at protecting women from sexual assault. If the
laws were designed to protect women, this exception would make no
sense. . . . [I]f a woman suffers no less pain, humiliation, or fear from
forcible sexual penetration by her husband than by a relative, a boyfriend, or
a stranger, the difference is not great enough to warrant the total insulation of
the former but not the latter from legal sanction.
Note, Sexism in Society, supra note 67, at 925-26.
The ancient patriarchs who came together to write their early covenants had
used the rape of women to forge their own male power-how then could they
see rape as a crime of man against women? . . . Rape could not be
envisioned as a matter of female consent or refusal; nor could a definition
acceptable to males be based on a male-female understanding of a female's
right to her bodily integrity. Rape entered the law through the back door, as it
were, as a property crime of man against man. Woman, of course, was viewed
as the property.
S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape 18 (1975).
[Vol. 1:389
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a violation of personal and bodily integrity and makes prosecution of rape
complaints difficult and humiliating.
A primary objective of recent rape law reforms is to induce the legal
system to abandon sexist premises and to prosecute rapes in a manner
consistent with other crimes. Ostensibly, such reforms seek to shift the
focus of prosecution from the victim and toward the offender. 7" Insti-
tution of these reforms provides equal treatment to rape victims insofar as
the legal system does not impose formal handicaps beyond those imposed
on victims of other crimes. This limited goal of consistency, however, fails
to address satisfactorily the plight of rape victims. Instead, the legal
system must reject male definitions of rape 74 without conceding the
crime's distinctiveness."5
73. Berger, supra note 67, at 12.
74. That forcible genital copulation is the "worst possible" sex assault a person
can sustain, that it deserves by far the severest punishment, equated in some
states with the penalties for murder, while all other manner of sexual assaults
are lumped together under the label of sodomy and draw lesser penalties by
law, can only be seen as an outdated masculine concept that no longer applies
to modern crime.
S. Brownmiller, supra note 72, at 378. Lorenne M.G. Clark and Debra J. Lewis express the
definitional problem in these terms:
If the laws against rape provided the model of consensual sexuality which
some assume they do, serving as much as an ideal to be striven for, as an
articulation of the basic standards to be maintained, and if these laws were
enforced with that goal in mind, then the inequality of power between the
sexes upon which male supremacy rests would disappear.
L Clark and D. Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive Sexuality 27-28 (1977).
75. When rape is placed where it truly belongs, within the context of modern
criminal violence and not within the purview of ancient masculine codes, the
crime retains its unique dimensions, falling midway between robbery and
assault. . . . [y] et the differences between rape and an assault or a robbery
are as distinctive as the obvious similarities . . . [T]n rape the threat of
force obtains a highly valued sexual service through temporary access to the
victim's intimate parts, and the intent is not merely to "take," but to
humiliate and degrade.
S. Brownmiller, supra note 72, at 377-78. Recently courts have begun to acknowledge rape
as a distinctive crime in terms of its impact on victims, rather than in terms of the danger to
the falsely accused:
[Rape] is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total
contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and
for the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships
are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the "ultimate violation of
self."
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (citation omitted). "Rape constitutes an
intrusion upon areas of the victim's life, both physical and psychological, to which our
society attaches the deepest sense of privacy." United Statesex reL Latimer v. Sielaff, 561
F.2d 691,694 (7th Cir. 1977). Some commentators view rape primarily as a crime of sex
which expresses male power over women and not just as a violent act which occurs in the
Law and Inequality
Justice Brennan's classification of rape trials involving minor
victims under the general rubric of criminal trials frustrates the basic
trend in rape law reform. While his categorization may appear consistent
with the reform goal of eliminating unequal treatment of rape victims,
such an analogy is inapposite. An Aristotelian notion of justice demon-
strates the fallacy of any such comparison. According to Aristotle, justice
requires not only equal treatment for equals, but also unequal treatment
for unequals.76 The injustice of Globe lies in equating minor rape victims
with, for example, victims of burglary and car theft. 7 7
Globe represents a sharp regression in the attempt to educate the
legal system as to the nature and societal context of rape. Rape is a
consequence of social conditions, not a natural fact. 7 The physical attack
itself expresses dominance over, as well as hostility toward, women."' The
legal definition of rape reflects the imbalance of power between men and
women from which the crime itself derives.80 Historically, the law has
viewed wives and daughters as property subject to male dominion."'
Legal codification of sexual stereotypes which burden the rape victim and
favor the rapist further demonstrate male dominion. 82 Removal of formal
burdens through procedural reforms conferred a measure of surface
context of sex. See Largen, History of Women's Movement in Changing Attitudes, Laws
and Treatment Toward Rape Victims, in Sexual Assault 69 (M. Walker & S. Brodsky ed.
1976); L Clark and D. Lewis, supra note 74, at 24-25.
76. Aristotle, Politics, Book 111, Ch. 9, 1280a.
77. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has noted this concept. "There is a real
inequality- notwithstanding the surface uniformity- in according the same disposition to
persons different in essential characteristics, as was noted long ago by Aristotle .... .
Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 282 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
"[lt is as old in philosophy at least as Aristotle, and it is settled in the law as well, that the
application of an apparently uniform rule may in reality engender unfair discrimination
when like measures are applied to unlike cases." International Union of Elec., Radio and
Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
78. "[Rape] is produced by a certain kind of society and not by an eternal, immutable
human nature." L Clark and D. Lewis, supra note 74, at 28.
79. A woman is perceived by the rapist both as hated person and desired
property. Hostility against her and possession of her may be simultaneous
motivations, and the hatred for her is expressed in the same act that is the
attempt to "take" her against her will. In one violent crime, rape is an act
against person and property.
S. Brownmiller, supra note 72, at 185 (emphasis in the original).
80. See E. Hilberman, The Rape Victim 6-8 (1976); S. Brownmiller, supra note 72, at
16-30.
81. "As the first permanent acquisition of man, his first piece of real property, woman
was, in fact, the original building block, the cornerstone, of'the house of the father.' " S.
Brownmiller, supra note 72, at 17.
82. The legal system has traditionally held a stereotypical view of rape which derived
from sources such as the Biblical story of Potiphar's wife and the works of Sigmund Freud.
Berger, supra note 67, at 25.
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equality between the sexes which many hoped would lead to a more
fundamental equality. 3 Globe rejects this fundamental equality through
its elevation of surface equality as the prevailing legal maxim.
Recognition of the need for closure in cases involving minor rape
victims could reduce the power disparity between men and women. The
legal system justifies closed trials for minor offenders based on the
rationale that minors form a class inherently distinct from adults.8" Yet
Globe prohibits states from exercising a like solicitude on behalf of minor
rape victims," thus prescribing unequal treatment for persons whom the
law has declared to be equals. The juvenile justice system underscores
this supposed equality by rejecting the criminal label for minor of-
fenders8" and thus eliminating the basic legal distinction between
offenders and victims.
Globe imposes a burden on minor rape victims which the legal
system does not impose on minor rapists. This disturbing paradox 8
constitutes an instance of gender inequality which the legal system cannot
disguise by distinguishing between minors who rape and minors who are
raped. Globe secures a status quo in which males receive absolute
protection while females receive only a conditional protection.
The issue of closure during the testimony of minor rape victims
requires a sensitive appraisal of the nature of rape and the paradigm of
male power that rape represents. Section 16A's paternalistic origin 8
highlights the need to assess Globe with reference to the power imbalance
between the sexes. Originally enacted in 1923, section 16A protects
children as property, just as the male definition of rape protects women as
property. 9 Although research confirms that the law's initial aim retains
83. Berger, supra note 67, at 11, 100; S. Brownmillersupra note 72, at 391; Largen,
supra note 75, at 72-73.
84. People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 862,867, 161 P.2d 498, 501 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1945).
85. Globe III. 102 S.Ct. at 2621.
86. In re Alley, 174 Wis. 85, 91-92, 182 N.W. 360, 362 (1921); State v. Heart
Ministries, Inc., 227 Kar. 224, 253, 607 P.2d 1102, 1109 (1980).
87. "[The Court's holding in Globe] advances a disturbing paradox. Although states are
permitted, for example, to mandate the closure of all proceedings in order to protect a 17-
year-old charged with rape, they are not permitted to require the closing of part of criminal
proceedings in order to protect an innocent child who has been raped or otherwise sexually
abused." Globe III, 102 S.Ct. at 2623 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. [The] legislative history reveals that G.L. c. 278, § 16A, stands at the nexus
of two overlapping strands of policy; the Legislature wished to shield certain
victims of sex crimes from the difficult experience of testifying in public and
the Legislature joined this solicitude for victims with the broad, paternal
protection afforded children generally.
Globe 1, 379 Mass. at 858, 401 N.E.2d at 368 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
89. "[ilf woman was man's original corporal property, then children were, and are, a
wholly owned subsidiary." S. Brownmiller, supra note 72 at 281.
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its validity," measures designed to protect minor victims cannot depend
on paternalistic, property-oriented concerns for children.9' Globe dem-
onstrates the inadequacies of such measures when balanced against the
right of access. Minor rape victims merit special protection not only
because of their minority status, but also because they are victims of a
crime stemming from gender inequality. 9'
In following his first guiding principle, Justice Brennan considered
only the historic practice surrounding general criminal trials. He did not
examine the more specific record of trials involving minor sex crime
victims. While Justice Brennan's characterization of the particular
proceeding as simply a criminal trial is facially correct, case law and
statutes support Chief Justice Burger's assertion that historical practice
compels the restriction of access to sex crime trials. 93
The Globe majority refused to distinguish minor rape victims from
victims of other crime.94 This stance conflicts with the longstanding
practice of treating minor sex crime victims as a singular class.9" Unlike
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Brennan did not consider historical practice
dispositive in Globe. He did acknowledge, however, that a tradition of
90. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
91. Reliance on such arguments is no more satisfactory than the conservative stance that
assumes rape is simply a law and order matter. See Largen, supra note 75, at 72.
92. While section 16A appears to represent a convergence of traditional paternalism and
feminism, any argument that attempts to combine the two in defense of the statute is
untenable. See S. Brownmiller, supra note 72, at 392-93. Brownmiller describes an
analogous situation that exists with regard to the anti-pornography movement. Id.
Traditionally composed of conservative and religious factions, this movement has only
recently acquired a feminist perspective. Id.
93. Justice Burger cited statutes from eight jurisdictions which provide for closure in
cases involving minor sex crime victims. Globe III, 102 S. Ct. at 2624 n.3.
[I] he courts generally concede that the right to have members of the public
present in a case of this character [statutory rape] is subject to some
limitations. Hence a trial judge in the exercise of a sound discretion may
exclude members of the public as may become necessary to protect a witness
from embarrassment by reason of having to testify to delicate or revolting
facts, as a child, or where it is demonstrated that the one testifying cannot,
without being freed from such embarrassment, testify to facts material to the
case.
United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Alaska), affd, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959). "[Closing the courtroom to spectators during the
testimony of a rape victim] is a frequent and accepted practice when the lurid details of such
a crime must be related by a young lady." Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888,891 (8th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967).
94. "Surely it cannot be suggested that minor victims of sex crimes are the only crime
victims who, because of publicity attendant to criminal trials, are reluctant to come forward
and testify." Globe III, 102 S.Ct. at 2622 (emphasis in the original).
95. "It is considered that it is a matter of common knowledge that such victims suffer far
beyond anything suffered by men or women in connection with other classes of crimes."
State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 149, 33 N.W.2d 305, 309 (1948).
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openness conferred special force on a claim of access. 96 This disregard for
the established tradition of closure during the testimony of minor rape
victims conflicts with Justice Brennan's stated respect for the con-
stitutional significance of historical practice.
In Globe, Justice Brennan determined under his second principle
that the structural value of open trial supported a right of access. 9' He
identified enhancement of the administration of justice and promotion of
public respect as benefits accruing to the trial process as the result of
accessibility. 9s
Empirical data and policy considerations refute both of the
rationales underlying Justice Brennan's opinion in Globe. Testimony in
open court can unnerve an emotionally stable adult.9 The trial process is
a particularly brutal experience for sex crime victims, regardless of age.100
Open trial from the victim's perspective constitutes a second rape.' 0 ' The
trauma resulting from a sex crime prosecution frequently matches that of
the assault itself.10 2 Social scientists contend that the legal process
trauma'0 3 accompanying rape trials involving children may actually
harm the child-victim more than the original crime."1°
Legal process trauma stems initially from the child's unprepared-
ness to face the trial setting. Minor victims lack the emotional stamina to
enable them to cope with this frightening aspect of the adult world.0 5 The
public setting of the trial intensifies their apprehension. 106 The public's
96. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589.
97. Globe III, 102 S.Ct. at 2620.
98. Id.
99. Hilberman, supra note 80, at 53.
100. L Holmstrom & A. Burgess, The Victims of Rape: Institutional Reactions chs. 6,7
(1978).
101. J. Bode, Fighting Back Ch. 7 (1978); Holmstrom & Burgess, supra note 100, at232,
235-36.
The victim will be questioned in front of [courtroom spectators]. She will be
asked identifying information, such as her name, address, or where she
works. She will be asked about intimate aspects of the rape as well as about
her personal life. The questioning often concerns minute details of the sexual
aspects of the incident. No item is left to the imagination. Everyone in the
courtroom is given the chance to participate vicariously in the rape.
Id. at 163.
102. Holmstrom & Burgess, supra note 100, at 229.
103. Legal process trauma is the damaging psychological effect of legal proceedings on a
child victim. Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal
Justice System, in Rape Victimology 284 (L Schultz ed. 1975).
104. A. Kinsey, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female 121 (1953); Hilberman, supra
note 80, at 53; V. DeFrancis, Protecting the Child Victim of Sex Crimes Committed by
Adults 2 (1969).




presence heightens the dread that the child already feels toward this
formidable adult proceeding.
Rape is one of the most underreported crimes in the United
States.""' Estimates of the degree of underreporting vary widely." 8 Law
enforcement officials ascribe the underreporting of rape primarily to
victim reluctance resulting from fear and embarrassment. 0 9 One study
found unwillingness to suffer the trial ordeal a major reason for victim
reluctance to press charges."10 The same study cited concern over the
public setting of the trial as a factor contributing significantly to the desire
to avoid legal proceedings.'I
The reported rates of sex crimes against minors also understate the
true incidence of offenses." 2 Research reveals that minor victims and
their families often fail to prosecute once they have reported the rape. "3 A
significant reason for this failure is the parents' desire to protect the child
from legal process trauma. "4 The public setting of the trial plays a large
part in generating parental concern for the minor's well-being.'
Consequently, as with adult victims, open trials inhibit the reporting of
sex crimes against minors. Such underreporting of crime does not
promote the administration of justice.
In addition to its chilling effect on the reporting of sex crimes
against children, open trial contributes to distorted and inaccurate
testimony. Legal authorities historically have expressed concern over the
general testimonial capacity of children at trial. 6 The public's presence
in the courtroom further interferes with the child's ability to remember
and relate facts."' Open trials thereby impede fact-finding accuracy in
107. "Forcible rape, a violent crime against the person, has been recognized by law
enforcement as one of the most under-reported of all [FBI] Index crimes . . ." United
States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States
13-14 (1980), quoted in Appellee's brief at 28, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
102 S.CL 2613 (1982).
108. Curtis. Present and Future Measures of Victimization in Forcible Rape, in Sexual
Assault 61, 63-64 (M. Walker & S. Brodsky eds. 1976). See Griffin, Rape: The All-
American Crime, in Rape Victimology20 (L Schultz ed. 1975) (the figureof reported rapes
must be multipled by a factor of ten); M. Amir, Patterns in Forcible Rape27-28(1971) (one
in five, or possibly one in twenty rapes may actually be reported).
109. Crime in the United States, supra note 107.
110. Holmstrom & Burgess, supra note 100, at 58.
111. Id. at 58, 227.
112. L Schultz, The Child as a Sex Victim: Socio-Legal Perspectives, in Rape
Victimology 257, 258 (L Schultz ed. 1975).
113. DeFrancis, supra note 104, at 187.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 214 (19th ed. 1853).




cases of rape against minor victims and thus adversely affect the
administration of justice.
Justice Brennan noted in Richmond Newspapers that the judiciary
is a coordinate branch of government in the fullest sense."' In Globe, he
found that trial access contributes to the public respect that a democratic
institution requires for support. 19 Assuming that legislation expresses
the popular will, Globe will not promote this requisite public trust in the
courts. Legislatures and courts traditionally have demonstrated concern
for minor sex crime victims through statutes and court orders restricting
trial access. 20 Such official actions reflect the public's empathy toward
minor victims. Globe will only diminish the public's respect for the legal
system.' 2
Public respect for the courts will also decline because of the harsh
gender disparity which Globe represents. By withdrawing the distinctive
label traditionally attached to minor victims by section 16A, Globe will
discredit the courts in the eyes of the population growing increasingly
aware of women's social and legal inequality.
Globe signals a retreat from progress toward a law of rape based on
modern reality rather than sexual myths. Justice Brennan's suggestion
that the courts resolve individual questions of closure on a case-by-case
basis further illustrates this retrenchment.'. 2 His approach will require a
hearing in which any opponents of closure could contest the victim's
inability to withstand open trial.2 3 By imposing this additional traumatic
proceeding, Globe shifts the focus of the rape prosecution back to the
victim, at least for the initial stages of trial. Such treatment humiliates and
stigmatizes the minor victim in a manner consistent with the legal
system's traditional distrust of the female accuser.' 2'
IV.
The structural justifications cited by Justice Brennan in support of
trial access lapse when the trial involves minor sex crime victims. A
presumptive right of access to the testimony of minor victims of rape
hampers the administration of justice by providing an additionhl
disincentive to report the most underreported crime. Moreover, ad-
herence to the open trial concept in such cases erodes public confidence in
118. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 595-96.
119. Globe III, 102 S. Ct at 2620.
120. See supra note 93.
121. See Bode, supra note 101, at 171-72 (Bode cites a 1977 Harris poll in which a
majority reacts negatively to two judges with harsh, sexist attitudes towards rape
victims).
122. Globe I1, 102 S.CL at 2621-22.
123. Id. at 2622 n.25.
124. See supra note 82.
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the legal system.
The initial successes of reform efforts in the law of rape provided
hope that the legal system could understand rape and its effect on
victims. 2 This change in judicial attitudes signalled to many a height-
ened sensitivity to the general concerns of women in society. Globe casts
doubt on whether the interests of minor rape victims and rape victims in
general rise to any significant level of deference.
Gordon Gidlund*
125.[Ajltering the way the complaining witness is treated at trial will not
guarantee that men and women everywhere abandon harsh traditional ideas
and double standards of sexual conduct. It will, however, give the Es-
tablishment's imprimatur to growing societal respect for women in a setting
where deep and primitive emotions have often beclouded rational
analysis.
Berger, supra note 67, at 100.
* Gordon Gidlund is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota.
